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* docs: GPUBreach-class audit and threat model for the host write pathsArthur Hanson Rasmusson10 hours
Audit of every host-side write whose target derives from guest data, against the GPUBreach (IEEE S&P 2026) chain: GPU PTE corruption -> arbitrary device read/write -> driver bugs -> CPU root. Findings: the host is structurally off that path (guest GPU page tables host-emulated, physical GPU PTEs host-owned, every write aperture-bounded by vfio_dma_rw to guest RAM or the vidmem shadow, no guest DMA to host buffers), and the remaining wrong-but-valid write class is bounded by the per-page resolution + refusal guards (FILL-TRUNC, FILL-PT-REFUSED, LOWFILL-REFUSED, GRFILL-DROP, stalled-VA demand, sema_copy_dst_pin_guard, DST-DIVERGE). Documents residual risks, what is not claimed (no isolation or side-channel claim; physical Rowhammer is out of scope), and three follow-ups.